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Abstract
We introduce a model of polarization in networks as a unifying setting for the
measurement of polarization that covers a wide range of applications. We consider a
substantially general setup for this purpose: node- and edge-weighted, undirected, and
connected networks. We generalize the axiomatic characterization of Esteban and Ray
(1994) and show that only a particular instance within this class can be used justifiably
to measure polarization in networks.
JEL codes: D63, D70, P16
Keywords: measurement, networks, polarization
∗We thank Joan Esteban, Jan Fa lkowski, and Fernando Vega-Redondo for their comments and to Debraj
Ray for our discussion at the beginning of the project. K. Huremovic´ acknowledges financial support from
ANR (project ANR 18-CE26-0020-01).
†IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Piazza S. Francesco, 19, 55100 Lucca, Italy. E-mail:
kenan.huremovic@imtlucca.it.
‡Wirtschaftsuniversita¨t Wien, Institute for Markets and Strategy, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Vienna,
Austria. E-mail: ali.ozkes@wu.ac.at
1
1 Introduction
Polarization in a population denotes an intensified disconnect among its groups. The analysis
of the sources and the consequences of polarization depends highly on what is measured and
how, which, in turn, is strictly contingent on the particular context. For instance, while
in the context of American politics polarization is perceived as the division of masses into
the cultural camps of liberals and conservatives, in the context of European multi-party
parliaments, it is seen as the existence of ideologically cohesive and distinct party blocks.1
So even the term “political polarization” is not indicative of what is being measured and
how. Existing literature reflects this complexity, and there is an abundance of measures
without a unified formalism that applies to comparable contexts.
Although there are substantial differences among existing measures across fields, one
ubiquitous feature can be identified. Namely, most of the current measures are proposed
in settings with a uni-dimensional scalar attribute on which the polarization is assumed to
occur. However, conflicts in societies are in general related to an irreducibly complex set of
attributes and most of the empirical work rely on categorical data on various characteristics.2
Dimensionality reduction approaches are called for in many instances, because the existing
polarization measures allow for only a uni-dimensional, or at most a bi-dimensional domain
(Hill and Tausanovitch, 2015). However, reduced dimensions can be questionable for their
capacity to represent the actual phenomenon of interest (Kam et al., 2017).
In this paper, we propose the formalism of network theory to study the measurement
of polarization which delivers the desired generality and spans a large variety of contexts.
We fully characterize a polarization measure following the axiomatic setting introduced by
Esteban and Ray (1994) (henceforth ER) for distributions on the real line. Same as ER, we
restrict ourselves to distributions with finite support.
Our setup is built on undirected networks in which both nodes and links are weighted.
A node in the network represents a certain attribute or grouping of individuals in the pop-
ulation. The weight of a node corresponds to the number of individuals in the population
that are characterized by the attribute or members of the group (e.g., a political party).
The weighted links describe (direct) bilateral relationships between nodes. This setup is
quite general and can represent a wide range of settings in which measuring polarization
is an issue of first-order importance. We describe a number of important examples in the
1See Fiorina et al. (2005) and Maoz and Somer-Topcu (2010) for the two different contexts.
2Examples include ethnolinguistics (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008), ethnic power relations (Wimmer
et al., 2009), and political retweets (Conover et al., 2011).
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next section, with a particular focus on the political domain, not only because it is a central
point of discussion, but also because it comprises of a variety of aspects that can be cap-
tured distinctly within network formalism. For instance, we show how elite polarization can
be modeled within our framework through networks of politicians, parties, or policy space.
Mass polarization, on the other hand, can be modeled through a network of opinions or
preferences. Going beyond the political domain, we furthermore discuss how our approach
can be used to study polarization in any setting with multidimensional distributions with
finite support.
The axiomatic approach developed by ER for distributions with finite support on the
real line led to the development of measures in several other domains, such as measures for
continuous distributions as in Duclos et al. (2004) and measures for binary classifications as in
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) (henceforth MRQ). Most of the applications employing
measures within this line of work lie in the fields of income inequality and social conflicts.
In their seminal contribution in this context, ER conceptualize polarization as the aggregate
antagonism in a population. The effective antagonism an individual feels against another
individual depends on how alienated she feels from the other’s group and how identified
she feels with her own group. According to ER, a population in which individuals are
identified within groups is polarized if there is a high level of intra-group homogeneity, a
high level of inter-group heterogeneity, and a small number of large-enough groups. They
deliver a characterization of a class of polarization measures, based on an axiomatization
built around distributional properties and not confined to incomes or wealth, although the
main motivations of ER were about income and wealth distributions.
Following ER, we provide an axiomatic characterization for measures of network polar-
ization. We argue that networks represent a powerful tool to capture any distribution with
a finite support and a notion of distance. Thus, the strength of our contribution lies in the
fact that we deliver an axiomatic foundation for a family of measures that are applicable in
a significantly larger set of domains. Furthermore, as any distribution considered in ER or
MRQ can be represented as a network, our work can be seen as a unifying generalization,
with ER and MRQ as special cases.
The class of measures characterized by ER is identified by the range of values that
parameter α, which captures the importance of identification in the effective antagonism,
can take. Our first result shows, quite surprisingly, that this class is thinned down by a
unique value, i.e., α = 1 (Theorem 1).3 Note that adaptations of these axioms are neither
trivial nor straightforward, as networks allow for a much larger generality in representing
3MRQ also identify α = 1 in their setup, which is a special case of ours. Furthermore, their axiomatization
is different than ours and ER.
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discrete distributions than the real line. Recent literature on the measurement of polarization
carried along the restricting assumption that the attributes can be captured by the values of
a scalar variable. We take off where ER leave, and deliver an analysis that does not “sweep
a serious dimensionality issue under the rug” (ER, p. 823). Our approach accommodates a
significantly larger variety of settings that are not confined to scalar attributes, and naturally
include the case of the Euclidean distance on the real line as a special case. This entails a
solution to an unresolved issue in this line of research as a by-product, in that our results
point to the choice of an exact value within the interval (0, α∗ ' 1.6].4
It is desirable that polarization measures attain their maximum at the symmetric bipolar
distribution. Contrary to the real intervals, in networks there can be any finite number
of nodes with maximal distance between them. Still, we show that any measure within
the family we characterize is maximized at the symmetric bipolar distribution — when the
population is symmetrically distributed among the two most distant nodes in the network
(Proposition 1).
Finally, we show that if we restrict our attention to particular classes of networks emerging
in certain domains such as language trees (class of tree networks) or income distributions
(class of line networks), one of the axioms, Axiom 3, can be weakened in a systematic way to
allow for a wider class of measures that can be used consistently (Theorem 2). For instance,
in the special case of line networks that can be used to represent income distributions, our
set of axioms and the class of measures reduce to the ones in ER.
Related literature
It presents a challenge to pay a fair tribute to the ever-growing literature on the measurement
of polarization. Here, we refer to a set of papers in different domains and discuss a few closely
related ones. We mention several other works in Section 5.
Polarization is studied in social sciences (particularly in economics and political sci-
ence) in relation to economic inequality (Esteban et al., 2007, Esteban and Ray, 2012,
Zhang and Kanbur, 2001), social conflict (Desmet et al., 2017, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol,
2008, Østby, 2008), political economy (Aghion et al., 2004, Desmet et al., 2012, Lindqvist
and O¨stling, 2010), international relations (Maoz, 2006b), political ideologies (Abramowitz
and Saunders, 2008, Fiorina and Abrams, 2008, Lelkes, 2016, Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017,
Ozdemir and Ozkes, 2014), political sentiments (Boxell et al., 2017, Garcia et al., 2015), and
social attitudes (DiMaggio et al., 1996, Lee et al., 2014, McCright and Dunlap, 2011), among
others.
4ER proposes further restrictions in that regard by imposing an additional axiom (Axiom 4) that brings
about a lower bound, i.e., α ≥ 1.
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We want to emphasize that we are not the first to consider an ER-type approach to
the measurement of polarization in networks. For instance, both Esteban and Ray (1999)
and Esteban and Ray (2011) explore this issue. However, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to provide an axiomatic characterization for measures of polarization
in networks.5 Fowler (2006a,b) and Maoz (2006b) are among the leading examples where
network formalism is proposed for the measurement of polarization, without an axiomatic
treatment.6 Finally, Permanyer and D’Ambrosio (2015) characterize a distinct family of
measures for categorical attributes by using identification-alienation framework and a number
of additional axioms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment we
study and illustrate the wide applicability of our approach. In Section 3 we define polariza-
tion, state the axioms, and deliver our major results. In Section 4 we discuss the importance
of network structure in terms of polarization and formally illustrate the connection between
our work and previous literature. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Networks and polarization
We consider a population in which individuals belong to n > 0 mutually exclusive groups
of potentially different sizes. A group may be, for instance, a political party, ethnic group,
or a set of individuals that share the same attributes. For each group i, pii ≥ 0 denotes
the number of individuals in group i. When pii = 0 we say that group i is empty. Vector
pi ∈ Rn≥0 describes the distribution of a population among n groups.
Bilateral relationships between groups are described with an undirected weighted graph
(UWG) g, with the set of nodes, N(g), equal to the set of groups, and the set of undirected
links (or edges) E(g) = {{i, j} : {i, j} ∈ N2 and i 6= j}. As usual, we denote the edge
between nodes i and j in graph g with ij and the weight of that edge with gij ≥ 0. While
we treat weights quite generally, it is useful to think of gij as the direct distance between
two connected nodes i and j – a higher gij implies a weaker connection between i and j.
7
For the remaining part of the paper we write ij ∈ g instead of {i, j} ∈ E(g) to indicate that
there is an edge between nodes i and j in g. When nodes i and j are not directly connected,
5Esteban and Ray (1999) arrive at α = 1 in their attempt to connect the intensity of conflict to polariza-
tion, without an axiomatic discussion, while Esteban and Ray (2011) supplement the four axioms in Duclos
et al. (2004) with a fifth axiom that delivers α = 1.
6The measure Maoz (2006b) uses is developed in the unpublished working paper by Maoz (2006a), and
while inspired by Duclos et al. (2004), it is only shown to satisfy an extended and qualitatively different set
of properties.
7The particular interpretation of weights (gij)i,j∈N depends on the application, as we demonstrate in
Section 2.1.
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we write ij /∈ g. Moreover, since groups are represented as nodes, we use words group and
node interchangeably.
We restrict our attention to connected graphs, i.e., graphs in which there is a path
connecting any two nodes.8 The distance between nodes i and j in g, denoted with dg(i, j),
is measured using the notion of the shortest path. That is, while there may be different
routes one can take to reach node j starting from node i and moving along the links in g,
the distance between i and j is the length of the shortest path. This notion of distance, also
known as the geodesic distance, is the standard in graph theory and the theory of networks
(Newman, 2003, Jackson, 2008).
Let Gn denote the set of all UWGs with n nodes, and let {Gn}n∈N denote the family of all
UWGs with any finite number of nodes. The main object of our analysis is the ordered pair
(g,pi) ∈ Gn×Rn≥0, which represents a weighted (node-weighted and link-weighted) network.
We use N to denote the set of all networks with finite number of nodes.
In the special case when pi = 1, (g,pi) coincides with the standard notion of a (link-)
weighted network.9 If, additionally, gij = 1 whenever ij ∈ g, then (g,pi) is a binary network.
Thus (g,pi) is a fairly general object that can be used to represent any undirected network we
observe, allowing for weights on nodes and edges. In Section 4 we show that any distribution
studied in ER or any classification covered by MRQ can be represented as a network.
A polarization measure is a mapping P : N → R≥0 that assigns to each network
(g,pi) ∈ N a non-negative real number.
Before turning to the axiomatic analysis, we discuss a number of examples in which data
can be represented as a network and measuring polarization is of interest.
2.1 Examples
2.1.1 Polarization in political networks
We consider several networks that arise in politics, each of which encodes a different aspect
of the prevailing political climate. In particular, we consider situations in which collection
of individuals express their preferences over alternatives, natural examples of which include
a parliament voting on bills and an electorate choosing among candidates. We discuss how
these two can be modeled as networks in order to measure elite and mass polarization.10
We start with the case of a parliament with possibly more than two parties. Let there
8We consider only connected graphs in this paper. Our insights can be extended, in a somewhat ad-hoc
manner, to cases when g is unconnected, for instance, by defining the distance between nodes from different
components of g to be equal to the longest path between any two connected nodes in g.
9Alternatively, one can think of (g,pi) as a distribution pi on graph g.
10See Kearney (2019) for a review focusing on networks in the political domain from a general perspective.
6
be N ∈ N representatives denoted by R = {1, ..., N} and T ∈ N parties denoted by T =
{t1, . . . , tT}. Suppose there are k ∈ N bills that are sponsored by representatives, either
individually or in groups, which are thereafter voted for approval in the parliament. Let
vij ∈ {0, 1} denote the vote of i for the bill j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} and V = {0, 1}k denote the set
of possible vote combinations.
Network of representatives, (g′,pi′), link-weighted.
The set of nodes in graph g′ is R = {1, . . . , N}. For any two representatives i and j, let
g′ij ≥ 0 denote the share of bills on which they do not vote in the same way.11 Thus, g′ij
stands for the (inverse of the) strength of their connection, where g′ij = 0 indicates that i
and j always vote the same way.12 When they never vote the same way on any bill, they are
not directly connected, hence ij /∈ g′. The size of every node i ∈ R is pi′i = 1, thus pi′ = 1, as
each node represents a unique representative. An example of networks as such can be found
in Andris et al. (2015).
Network of co-sponsorships, (gˆ′, pˆi′), unweighted.
The set of nodes in gˆ′ is R = {1, . . . , N}. gˆ′ij = 1 if i and j co-sponsored al least one bill
together, and ij /∈ gˆ′ otherwise.13 The size of each node i ∈ R is pˆi′i = 1, thus pˆi′ = 1, since
each node represents a unique representative. Fowler (2006a) studies this type of networks.
Network of votes, (g˜′, p˜i′), node-weighted.
The set of nodes in graph g˜′ is V = {v1, . . . , v2k}. Two nodes (vote combinations) vi and vj
are connected, i.e., ij ∈ g˜′, whenever vi and vj differ only in a single coordinate (bill). Each
link in g˜′ has a weight 1. p˜i′i denotes the number of individuals with voting profile vi, and p˜i
′
is the corresponding distribution. Brams et al. (2007) and Moody and Mucha (2013), among
others, study this type of networks.
Network of parties, (g¯′, p¯i′), node- and link-weighted.
The set of nodes in g¯′ is T = {t1, . . . , tT}. g¯′ij denotes the share of bills on which a majority
of representatives in both parties vote the same way.14 Thus, ij /∈ g¯′ indicates that there is
no bill that is supported (or opposed) by a majority of representatives in both parties. The
size of a node ti ∈ T , p¯i′i, denotes the number of seats of the party i in the parliament.15 See
11Alternatively, one can model that two representatives are connected (with weight 1) if they vote together
for more than 50% of the bills and not connected otherwise, in which case we would have an unweighted
network.
12The fact that g′ij = 0 does not indicate that link between i and j does not exist, but that the distance
between i and j is 0.
13Alternatively, gˆ′ij may reflect how many bills i and j co-sponsored together, in which case, we would
have a link-weighted network.
14g¯′ij captures the ideological distance i.e., the extent the policies of two parties overlap, which can be
measured in different ways. Maoz and Somer-Topcu (2010) take, for instance, the similarities in party
manifestos.
15Alternatively, p¯i′ can be taken as 1, disregarding party sizes and focusing on closeness among parties, in
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Maoz and Somer-Topcu (2010) for an analysis on party networks.
Each network we describe above focuses on a different aspect of the political activities in
the parliament. Accordingly, the corresponding measures of polarization provide different,
yet complementary, insights into congressional polarization. For instance, P(g′,pi′) tells
us how polarized the policy positions of representatives based on their vote histories are,
regardless of their party affiliations, whereas P(g¯′, p¯i′) measures the party-level polariza-
tion.16 Also, P(g˜′, p˜i′) is informative about the polarization with respect to policy space,
while P(gˆ′, pˆi′) captures the polarization among representatives with respect to policy co-
operation.
For illustration, let us more closely compare networks (g′,pi′) and (g˜′, p˜i′), which are
based on exactly the same data, i.e., votes on bills. Consider the following example with 3
bills and 8 representatives, where “+” in (1) represents approval for a bill and “−” represents
disapproval.
R1−3 R4 R5−6 R7 R8
I + − − + +
II − + + − +
III − − + + +
(1)
Panel (a) of Figure 1 below shows the corresponding network of representatives, whereas
the panel (b) shows the corresponding network of votes.17 Since the two networks describe
two different sets of relations in the legislation, we may expect that the measured level of
polarization differs between them. Nevertheless, any polarization measure in our framework
is applicable to both cases. To obtain a deeper insight, for instance, one can also com-
pare polarization of networks representing different types of relationships with a suitable
normalization e.g., by dividing the polarization index with the maximal value it can attain.
We next turn to the case of mass polarization. Our example is concerned with an elec-
torate choosing among candidates for an office (or individuals expressing preferences over
policy alternatives such as remain, soft-Brexit, and hard-Brexit). Let there be a set of alter-
natives X = {x1, . . . , xm} and each individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be endowed with a preference
which case we would have a link-weighted network.
16We write P(g,pi) in place of P((g,pi)) with a slight abuse of notation.
17Both networks (g′,pi′) and (g˜′, p˜i′) have a level of “structural regularity.” Graph g′ leads to a complete
network structure in the sense that each node is connected to any other node, even though there is a
substantial heterogeneity across weights of the links. Graph g˜′ has a lattice structure. This is by no means
necessary for our approach, which is applicable to connected networks with arbitrary structure. For instance,
as in Andris et al. (2015), two representatives can be connected if they vote the same way sufficiently many
times, then the g′ will not have the complete graph structure. Co-sponsorship networks such as (gˆ′, pˆi′)
have, in general, quite irregular structures, as in Fowler (2006b).
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R1 R2
R3
R4
R5R6
R7
R8
0 : 1 : 2 :
(a) Network of representatives.
Nodes denote representatives and
two nodes are not connected if
they do not agree on any issue.
The thickness of edges indicate
weights.
000
100
010
001
011
111
110
101
1
1
1
2
3
(b) Network of votes. The nodes
represent all possible vote combi-
nations e.g., 100 represents the ap-
proval of only first bill.
Figure 1: Two possible network representations of the same profile of votes of representatives.
Pi ⊆ X × X that is a linear order, i.e., a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary
relation on X. Let L denote the set of all preferences over X and L n be the set of profile
of preferences.
Network of preferences, (g′′,pi′′). The set of nodes isL = (p1, . . . , pm!). Two nodes pi
and pj are connected with g
′′
ij = 1, whenever pi can be obtained from pj by switching only one
binary preference, i.e., the Kemeny distance between pi and pj is 1 (Kemeny, 1959).
18 We
denote with pi′′i the number of individuals with preference pi, and with pi
′′ the corresponding
distribution. See Cervone et al. (2012) for a study on preference networks.19
For an illustration, let {a, b, c} be the set of alternatives and consider the preference
profile with 11 individuals represented by (2).
2 3 2 4
a b c c
b a a b
c c b a
(2)
18A network of preferences can be represented as a special network of votes, in which each bill represents
a pairwise comparison of alternatives and transitivity is imposed.
19Often without explicitly using the language of networks, graph theoretical representations of preferences
are studied in the social choice literature widely. There is also a growing interest in measuring polarization in
preference profiles, as in Can et al. (2015, 2017). Note that network (g′′,pi′′) could alternatively be defined
using a weighted metric as in Can (2014).
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This profile of preferences can be represented with a network as depicted as in Figure 2.
abc
acb cab
bac bca
cba2
2
3
4
Figure 2: A distribution over a preference network with 3 alternatives and 11 individuals.
2.1.2 Beyond the political domain
While we paid a close attention to examples of networks from the political domain, our
approach can naturally be applied in a much wider range of applications, not necessarily
confined to those that are commonly studied using networks. For instance, our setting
can be adopted to study multidimensional polarization in any distribution with a discrete
support. To see how, take the example of polarization in a society with respect to income
and education (both measured on some discrete, increasing scale). The set of all pairs of
income (ι) and education () levels defines the set of nodes in the network. Two nodes
x = (xι, x) and y = (yι, y) are connected, with link xy of weight s (gxy = s), if, for
instance, |xι− yι|+ |x− y| = s, that is if the Manhattan distance between x and y is equal
to s.
Other potential applications include conflicts between groups (Esteban and Ray, 1999,
2011), private provision of public goods (Bramoulle´ and Kranton, 2007), research output
and citation networks (Leskovec et al., 2005), friendship networks (Calvo´-Armengol et al.,
2009), and trust networks (Richardson et al., 2003).
3 Identification-alienation framework and axiomatiza-
tion
To recall, our objective in this paper is two-fold. First, we propose network theory as a
unifying formalism to study polarization without any constraint on dimensionality. Second,
we present a theoretical foundation for a family of polarization measures in this setting. For
the latter, we closely follow the axiomatic approach in ER, who envisage polarization as
the aggregate antagonism in a population, based on the identification and alienation among
individuals.
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First, as in ER, we require polarization measures to satisfy the following property that
ensures invariance of the measure with respect to the size of the population
∑
i∈N(g) pii. Thus,
in fact, pi may represent also a probability mass function.
Assumption 1 (Homotheticity)
P(g,pi) ≥P(g′,pi′) =⇒ P(g, λpi) ≥P(g′, λpi′) for all (g,pi), (g′,pi′) ∈ N and λ > 0.
The antagonism between individuals depend on how they identify themselves and how
alienated they feel from others. In the network setup we propose, individuals in a population
are identified only with their definitive attributes, which are represented as nodes in the
network. As emphasized before, these attributes are by no means restricted to singletons or
a uni-dimensional space.
The effect of the feeling of identification of each individual on her antagonism towards
another is measured in relation to the presence of others that share the same attributes, hence
are in the same node. This effect is the basis of the intra-group homogeneity, and we denote
it with I(pii). Thus, when the nodes represent individuals, each individual feels the same
level of identification, whereas when nodes represent groups of individuals, the identification
an individual feels is a function of the size its node (I(pii)).
20 The only assumption we make
on the identification function I : R≥0 → R≥0 is that I(pii) > 0 whenever pii > 0.
The distance an individual perceives between herself and any other individual is a natural
component of the antagonism between individuals as it forms the basis of the inter-group
heterogeneity. We measure this alienation component as a function of the distance between
individuals a(d(i, j)). We assume that the alienation function a : R≥0 → R≥0 is a continuous
and nondecreasing function with a(0) = 0.
Finally, the effective antagonism of group i towards group j is measured by continuous
and strictly increasing function T (Ii, aij) of the identification of group i, Ii = I(pii), and the
alienation between groups i and j, aij = a(d(i, j)), satisfying T (Ii, 0) = 0. As in ER, we
consider polarization measures P : N → R≥0 defined as the sum of effective antagonisms:
P(g,pi) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piipijT
(
I(pii), a
(
dg(i, j)
))
. (3)
As we shall see, our axioms will pin down specific functional form for T
(
I(pii), a
(
dg(i, j)
))
.
Our goal is to follow the axiomatization in ER as closely as possible, and modify it only
when the network setting requires. As it turns out, the first two axioms can be restated only
with slight changes in the nomenclature. Axiom 3 needs an important adjustment.
20This implies that two groups (nodes) of the same size exhibit the same level of identification. While
potentially restrictive, this is standard in the identification-alienation framework (Esteban and Ray, 1994,
2012).
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Axiom 1
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes such that pix > piy = piz > 0 and pii = 0 ∀i ∈
N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, y) ≤ dg(x, z).
Statement: Fix pix and dg(x, y). There exists  > 0 and µ = µ(pix, dg(x, y)) > 0 such that
dg(y, z) <  and piy < µpix imply that for any (g
′,pi′) ∈ N with n ≥ 2 nodes such that
pi′x′ = pix, pi
′
w′ = piy + piz, dg′(x
′w′) = 1
2
(dg(x, y) + dg(x, z)) and pi
′
i′ = 0, i
′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, w′},
we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi).
The Axiom 1 captures the situations where two small groups join while keeping the
(average) distance the same.
pi2
pi3pi1
(a) The move shown by ar-
rows increase polarization.
pi2
pi3pi1
(b) Axiom 1 applies when the new node is fur-
ther away from the two small nodes as well.
Figure 3: Axiom 1.
Suppose in (g,pi) there is a node with large group and there are two other smaller and
equal-sized groups that are close to each other but further away from the larger group. Then
network (g′,pi′), in which smaller groups are joined at a node which is located in g′ at a
distance equal to their average distance (in g) to the large group, is more polarized. Figure
3 illustrates such moves.21 Note that the distance of the fourth node to smaller nodes is not
restricted in the axiom, allowing for moves such as the one depicted in panel (b) of Figure 3.
Axiom 2
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes such that pix > piz > 0, piy > 0, and pii = 0,∀i ∈
N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, z) > dg(x, y) > dg(y, z).
Statement: There exists  > 0 such that for any network (g′,pi′) with (pi′x′ , pi
′
y′ , pi
′
z′) =
(pix, piy, piz), and pi
′
i′ = 0, i
′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, y′, z′} such that dg(x, z) = dg′(x′, z′), 0 <
dg′(x
′, y′)− dg(x, y) = dg(y, z)− dg′(y′, z′) <  we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi).
Axiom 2 applies when the group at one extreme is larger than the one at the other extreme
and a third group is closer to the smaller of these two. When the group in-between moves
21Note that g and g′ do not have to be different and in our depictions we present axioms on the same
graphs.
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slightly closer to the smaller group and away from the larger group, polarization increases.22
Note that the relative size of the group in the middle is not restricted. Figure 4 illustrates
such moves.
pi1 pi32
pi3
(a) The move shown by the arrow in-
creases polarization.
pi32
pi3
pi1
(b) Axiom 2 applies in such a move
as well, which is not possible on the
real line.
Figure 4: Axiom 2.
Note that the described move makes the middle group closer to the smaller group, but
its new location does not have to be close to its original position, as seen in panel (b) of
Figure 4. This kind of a move is not possible on the real line.
Axiom 3
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes such that pix > 0, piy = piz > 0 and pii = 0
∀i ∈ N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d > 0.
Statement: For any ∆ ∈ (0, pix
2
] and any network (g′,pi′) with (pi′x′ , pi
′
y′ , pi
′
z′) = (pix− 2∆, piy +
∆, piz + ∆), and pi
′
i′ = 0, i
′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, y′, z′} such that dg′(x′, y′) = dg′(x′, z′) = d and
dg(y, z) = dg′(x
′, z′), we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi) whenever dg(y, z) = cd, for any c > 1.
Axiom 3 states that as long as the distance between two lateral groups is greater than the
distance between the “middle group” and a lateral group, a network in which individuals from
the group in the middle are reallocated to extreme points will exhibit higher polarization.
Note that the relative size of the group in node x is not restricted. Furthermore, in a network,
dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d implies only that dg(y, z) ≤ 2d, whereas on the real line y 6= z and
|x − y| = |z − x| = d imply that |z − y| = 2d. We will come back to this crucial point in
Section 4.
We are now ready to state our central result, which identifies the measures of polarization
in networks that satisfy Axioms 1–3.
Theorem 1
A polarization measureP of the family defined in (3) satisfies Axioms 1–3 and homotheticity
22Axiom 2 is rather weak as it applies to only those (small) moves such that an increase in distance from
one extreme is equal to a decrease in the distance to the other extreme.
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pi2
pi1
pi3
∆ ∆
Figure 5: Axiom 3 dictates that the dissolution of the middle group into two extreme nodes
increases polarization.
if and only if
P(g,pi) = K
∑
i∈N(g)
∑
j∈N(g)
pi2i pijdg(i, j), (4)
for some constant K > 0.
Proof.
Sufficiency. Without loss of generality set K = 1. We prove that Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 are
satisfied for
Pα(g,pi) = K
∑
i∈N(g)
∑
j∈N(g)
pi1+αi pijdg(i, j), (5)
whenever α > 0. Clearly, (5) becomes (4) when α = 1. Establishing this claim is important
also for the proof of Theorem 2.
Axiom 1. Let pix = p and piy = piz = q. Using dg′(x
′, w′) = dg(x,y)+dg(x,z)
2
we get that
Pα(g,pi) = p
1+αqdg(x, y) + p
1+αqdg(x, z) + 2q
1+αqdg(y, z) + q
1+αpdg(x, y) + q
1+αpdg(x, z),
while
Pα(g
′,pi′) = p1+α(2q)
dg(x, y) + dg(x, z)
2
+ (2q)1+αp
dg(x, y) + dg(x, z)
2
.
After simplification we get:
Pα(g,pi) = (dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))(p
1+αq + q1+αp) + 2q2+αdg(y, z), and
Pα(g
′,pi′) = (dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))(p1+αq + q1+αp) + (2α − 1)(dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))q1+αp,
which implies Pα(g,pi) > Pα(g′,pi′) whenever (2α − 1)(dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))p > 2qdg(y, z).
When d(y, z) is small enough (d(y, z) < ) this inequality will hold for any α > 0 and q small
enough relative to p (q < µp), as required by Axiom 1.
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Axiom 2. Let pix = p, piy = q, and piz = r. Subtracting we get:
Pα(g,pi)−Pα(g′,pi′) = q1+α[p(dg′(x′, y′)− dg(x, y)) + r(dg′(z′, y′)− dg(y, z))]
+ q[p1+α(dg′(x
′, y′)− dg(x, y)) + r1+α(dg′(z′, y′)− dg(y, z))],
which is positive for any α > 0 whenever r < p, since dg′(x
′, y′) − dg(x, y) = dg′(z′, y′) −
dg(y, z), and therefore Pα satisfies Axiom 2.
Axiom 3. We now show thatP satisfies Axiom 3. To this end let dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d,
and let dg(y, z) = cd with c > 1. Furthermore, let pix = p + 2∆ and piy = piz = q −∆. We
can write:
Pα((g,pi); ∆) = 2cd
(
(q −∆)2+α)+ 2d((p+ 2∆)(q −∆)((p+ 2∆)α(q −∆)α)). (6)
To prove that P satisfies Axiom 3 it is sufficient to show that ∂Pα((g,pi),∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
∆=0,α=1
< 0 for
every (p, q) 0, except for at most one ratio p/q. Differentiating (6) at ∆ = 0 and dividing
by 2d (≥ 0) we get:
∂Pα
∂∆
∣∣∣∣
∆=0
< 0 ⇐⇒ −pα(p− 2(1 + α)q)+ qα(− (1 + α)p+ 2q − (2 + α)cq) < 0.
Dividing by p1+α > 0 and using z = q/p we get:
∂Pα
∂∆
∣∣∣∣
∆=0
< 0 ⇐⇒ f(z, α, c) < 0,
where f : R2≥0 × [1, 2]→ R is defined with:
f(z, α, c) = (1 + α)
[
z − z
α
2
+
z1+α
2
(2− c(2 + α))
1 + α
]
− 1
2
. (7)
One can easily verify f(z, 1, c) < 0 (f(z, 1, c) is a quadratic function in z) for any c ∈ [1, 2],
except for z = 1 when c = 1, therefore P satisfies Axiom 3 as well.
Necessity. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 in ER. We describe it briefly,
and refer the reader to ER for detailed derivation. Axioms 1–2 imply that function T is linear
in its second argument, thus θ(pi, δ) ≡ T (I(pi), a(dg(i, j))) can be written as θ(pi, δ) = φ(pi)δ.
Furthermore, Axiom 1 implies that φ(·) is an increasing function.23 Homotheticity implies
that φ(pi) = Kpiα for some constants (K, pi) 0. Finally, Axiom 3 implies f(z, α, 1) ≤ 0 for
all z. As seen in the first part of the proof this holds for α = 1. To see that it does not hold
for any other value α > 0, first note that f(1, α, 1) = 0. Furthermore, function f(z, α, 1) is
increasing in z at z = 1 when α < 1 and decreasing in z at z = 1 when α > 1. By continuity,
there exist 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 such that f(1+ 1, α, 1) > 0 when α < 1, and f(1− 2, α, 1) > 0
23See Kawada et al. (2018) for a solution to a technical problem arising from the original formulation of
Axiom 1 in ER.
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when α > 1.
A few comments are in order. First, recall that ER characterize measures of polarization
on the real line as
PER(pi) = K
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pi1+αi pij|i− j|, (8)
with K > 0 and α ∈ (0, α∗], with α∗ ' 1.6. The main difference between (4) and (8) is
that the index in (4) implies α = 1. The reason for this difference lies in the nature of the
distances, discussed in relation with Axiom 3. It requires that a move from a middle mass
(pix) to the lateral points (piy and piz) equidistant from the middle increases polarization
whenever they are individually further away from each other than they are to the midpoint.
Contrary to the real line, in (g,pi), dg(y, z) is not determined by dg(x, y) = dg(x, z), and
in fact it can very well happen that dg(y, z) < dg(x, y) even when dg(x, y) = dg(x, z). We
revisit this important matter in Section 4.3 below. Note that Axioms 1 and 2 also require
adaptation for the network setup, but these adaptations are minor and do not have important
implications on the form of the characterized family of measures.
Intuitively, a society is polarized if it can be grouped in a small number of homogeneous
groups of similar sizes that are very different from each-other and polarization is often con-
ceptualized to capture the level of bipolarity (or bimodality).24 Thus, it is desirable that a
polarization measure is maximized at a bipolar distribution. A bipolar network is one where
the population is split equally into two extreme (most distant) nodes. The maximal distance
between two nodes in graph g is called the diameter of g and is denoted by d(g).25 For any
graph g let piB(g) denote the distribution in which the population is split equally across two
nodes at distance d(g). Our next result shows that (g, piB(g)) is more polarized than any
other network (g,pi) under any measure within our characterization.
Proposition 1
P(g,piB(g)) >P(g,pi) for any (g,pi) with pi 6= piB(g) and any measure P defined in (4).
Proof.
We first prove that for any network (g,pi) such that pi has at lest 4 nonzero mass points, there
exists a 3 node network (g∗,pi∗) with g∗ij = d(g) for i, j ∈ N(g∗), and
∑3
i=1 pi
∗
i =
∑
i∈Ng pii
such that P(g,pi) <P(g∗,pi∗).
The proof is constructive. Assume, without loss of generality, that in (g,pi), we have
pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ · · · ≥ pin with pik > 0 and pik+1 = 0 for some k ≥ 4. Fixing K = 1 in (4) (without
24See Foster and Wolfson (2010) for a discussion on bipolarity of income distributions and DiMaggio et al.
(1996) for a more general discussion on bimodality, among others.
25More formally, d(g) = maxi,j∈N(g) dg(i, j). See Vega-Redondo (2007) or Jackson (2008).
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loss of generality) we get:
P(g,pi) ≤d(g)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
pi2i pijdg(i, j)
=d(g)
k−2∑
i=1
k−2∑
j=1
j 6=i
pi2i pij + pi
2
k−1
k∑
j=1
j 6=k−1
pij + pi
2
k
k∑
j=1
j 6=k
pij + pik−1
k−2∑
j=1
pi2j + pik
k−2∑
j=1
pi2j
 .
(9)
Denote the right hand side expression in (9) with P(g′,pi′), where g′ij = d(g) for all
i, j ∈ N(g) and pi′i = pii for all i ∈ N(g). Consider now a change in (g′,pi′) such that masses
in nodes k and k − 1 are merged at one of these nodes to obtain (g′′,pi′′). Simple algebra
gives:
P(g′′,pi′′) = d(g)
k−2∑
i=1
k−2∑
j=1
j 6=i
pi2i pij + (pik−1 + pik)
2
k−2∑
j=1
pij + (pik−1 + pik)
k−2∑
j=1
pi2j
 .
Subtracting P(g′,pi′) we get:
P(g′′,pi′′)−P(g′,pi′) = d(g)pik−1pik
[
2
k−2∑
j=1
pij − (pik−1 + pik)
]
> 0, (10)
where the inequality follows from the choice of k and k − 1 and the fact that k ≥ 4. Thus,
for any network (g,pi) with |N(g)| ≥ 4 have P(g,pi) <P(g′′,pi′′).
If k = 4, (g∗,pi∗) = (g′′,pi′′). If k > 4, the above described procedure of joining the
masses in nodes k − 1 and k − 2 can be iteratively applied.
To conclude the proof of the proposition, consider 3 different cases for (g,pi):
(i) |{i ∈ N(g) : pii > 0}| = 2. Clearly P(g,piB(g)) > d(g)2
(pii+pij
2
)3
> dg(i, j)
(
piipij(pii +
pij)
)
=P(g,pi) for any (g,pi) 6= (g,piB).
(ii) |{i ∈ N(g) : pii > 0}| = 3. Consider (g′,pi′) obtained from (g,pi) such that pi = pi′,
N(g) = N(g′), E(g) = E(g′) and g′ij = d(g) for any i, j ∈ N(g′). Clearly P(g,pi) ≤
P(g′,pi′). Construct pi′′ from pi′ by reallocating mass from any point to the other two
points as in Axiom 3. We have:
P(g,piB(g)) =P(g′,piB(g)) ≥P(g′,pi′′) >P(g′,pi′),
where the first inequality is implied by (i), while the second is a consequence of Axiom
3.
(iii) |{i ∈ N(g) : pii > 0}| ≥ 4. The claim follows from the first part of the proof and (ii).
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4 Discussion
In this section, we first discuss some important properties of the measures we characterize
in relation to the structure of networks. Then we show how our work is related to previous
papers in the literature. We conclude this section with a discussion on how the weakening
of the Axiom 3 can relate our characterization to the one in ER, by exactly describing the
relationship between the importance of identification (α) and the network structure.
4.1 Network structure and polarization
We first want to emphasize that the structure of a graph g determines the distance between
any two nodes in N(g). A change in the structure of a graph g, e.g., deleting a link, may
affect the measured levels of polarization, even if pi stays the same. Although empty (zero-
weight) nodes do not directly contribute to the level of polarization, they may be important
“indirectly” if, for instance, they are located on the shortest path between some non-empty
nodes. Figure 6 illustrates this point.
4 2
1
35
(a) (g,pi).
5
4
2
1
3
(b) (g′,pi).
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(c) (g′′,pi′′).
Figure 6: Three networks where each link has weight 1 and each node except the node 3 has weight
1 (pi3 = 0). (g
′,pi) is obtained from (g,pi) by deleting the link g13. (g′′,pi′′) is obtained from (g,pi)
by deleting the node 3. Note that pii = pi
′′
i for all i ∈ N(g′′). We have P(g,pi) < P(g′,pi) =
P(g′′,pi′′).
Next, we want to note that given Proposition 1, we have that d(g) > d(g′) implies
P(g,piB(g)) > P(g′,piB(g′)). That is, comparing two bipolar networks, the larger the
diameter, the higher the polarization.
Finally, in the special case when pi = 1, P(g,pi) is proportional to the average shortest
path in the graph g.26 Thus, the closer the individuals are, on average, the less polarized
the network is.
4.2 Relation to previous results
We argue that the settings considered in ER and MRQ are special cases of our setting, and
hence our results can be seen as generalizations of theirs. To start with, recall that ER
26The average shortest path in a network is closely related to the “closeness” measure (Vega-Redondo,
2007, Jackson, 2008).
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consider distributions on the real line with a finite support (p. 830). It is straightforward
to note that any distribution as such can be described as a network. To see this, let pi
be a distribution with a set of N mass points. Consider graph g with N nodes such that
gij = |i− j| for any two adjacent mass points i and j on the real line, and ij /∈ g otherwise.27
Indeed, we can represent any distribution on an m−dimensional space with finite number of
mass point as a network by simply setting gij = ‖i− j‖, where ‖·‖ can be any norm.
In the setting considered in MRQ the distance between any two different groups equals
to 1. It is immediate to note that this setting can be described by the network (g,pi) where
g is the complete graph such that gij = 1 for any pair of nodes i, j ∈ N(g). MRQ propose a
different set of axioms.28
4.3 Axiom 3 and its role in the network setting
Axiom 3 requires that the described change in (g,pi) leads to an increase in polarization
only when the distance between lateral nodes is at least as large as the distance between the
center node and lateral nodes. We now discuss less demanding versions of Axiom 3, labeled
systematically as Axiom 3(c), in which we require that the scenario in Axiom 3 leads to an
increase in polarization only if the lateral nodes are “far enough” (quantified by the scalar
c) from each other. This is of interest also because some settings imply a specific network
structure in which there is a clear lower bound for the distance between two lateral nodes
contemplated in Axiom 3. For instance, as we saw before, any discrete distribution on a
real line can be represented with a line network. On any line network, the distance between
lateral nodes is the double of the distance between the middle node and a lateral node, as it
is on the real line.
Axiom 3(c)
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes, pix > piy = piz > 0 and pii = 0 for all i ∈
N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d > 0.
Statement: Fix c ∈ (1, 2]. For any  ∈ (0, pix] and any network (g′,pi′) with (pi′x′ , pi′y′ , pi′z′) =
(pix−, piy+ 2 , piz+ 2), and pi′i′ = 0, i′ ∈ N(g′)\{x′, y′, z′} such that dg′(x′, y′) = dg′(x′, z′) = d
and dg(y, z) = dg′(y
′, z′), we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi) whenever dg(y, z) ≥ dc.
27This is not the unique way to represent a discrete distribution with n mass points as a network. However,
any consistent representation that relies on the same metric will lead to a network with the same polarization.
28The logical dependence between our axioms and the ones in MRQ is an interesting question that is left
for future research.
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c¯d
pi2
pi1
pi3
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dd
Figure 7: Axiom 3(c) requires that the move shown by the arrows should increase polarization if
c¯ ≥ c.
When c = 1, we have the same statement as in Axiom 3, while for c = 2 we have
essentially the Axiom 3 in ER. The particular value of c has important implications on the
resulting measure of polarization, as stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2
Fix c ∈ (1, 2]. There exists an interval [α(c), α¯(c)] ⊆ (0, α∗] with α∗ ' 1.6 such that the
polarization measure P of the family defined in (3) satisfies Axioms 1, 2, and 3(c) and
homotheticity if and only if
Pα(g,pi) = K
∑
i∈N(g)
∑
j∈N(g)
pi1+αi pijdg(i, j) (11)
for some constant K > 0 whenever α ∈ [α(c), α¯(c)]. Furthermore, c2 > c1 =⇒ [α(c1), α¯(c1)] ⊂
[α(c2), α¯(c2)].
Proof.
See the proof of Theorem 1 for the proofs of claims regarding Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 (the
Sufficency and the Necessity part). Similarly, Axiom 3(c) holds iff α is such that f(z, α, c) < 0
except for at most one point z, where f is defined in (7). To conclude the proof, two
observations about v(α, c) = maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) are important. First, v is increasing in α ∈
(1, 2] for any fixed c ∈ (1, 2] and changes the sign on the considered interval. Thus, there
exists α¯(c) such that v(α, c) ≤ 0 for α ∈ (1, α¯(c)]. Since v(α, c) is decreasing in c, α¯(c)
is increasing in c. Second, for α < 1 and fixed c, v decreases in α whenever v(α, c) ≥ 0
eventually becoming negative as v(1, c) < 0 for c > 1. This implies the existence of α(c) ∈
[0, 1]. Since v decreases in c we have that α(c) increases in c. From these two observations29
we conclude 2 ≥ c2 > c1 > 1 =⇒ [α(c1), α¯(c1)] ⊂ [α(c2), α¯(c2)].
Theorem 2 shows that as we make Axiom 3 less demanding, the range of values of param-
eter α for which our axioms is satisfied expands monotonically. In particular, if we restrict
ourselves to line networks, then the network structure implies that any move described in
29See Lemma 1 and 2 in Appendix A for the formal statements and proofs of these two observations.
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Axiom 3 is consistent with Axiom 3(c) for c = 2, and Axioms 1, 2 and 3(c) can be seen as
restatements of the Axioms 1–3 in ER.
Finally, it should be noted that the claim in Proposition 1 holds only for measures
characterized in Theorem 1, and not for any other measure as in (5) with α 6= 1. To see
this, take any graph g such that N(g) = {x, y, z} with 0 < gxy = gxz ≤ gyz. Then for
any α ∈ R≥0 \ {1}, there exists a distribution pi 6= piB(g) and  > 0 such that P(g,pi) >
Pα(g,piB(g)) whenever gyz = gxz+. This is a direct consequence of the fact that for α 6= 1,
Pα does not satisfy Axiom 3 when c is arbitrary close to 1.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a model of polarization in networks. This model can be used to study
the levels and trends of polarization in a wide range of applications. In Section 2, we
discussed several examples from political processes in parliaments and public preferences.
The potential of our proposal is by no means restricted to these examples as pointed to
before. To name a few areas beyond the domain of polity, for which a recent survey is
provided by Battaglini and Patacchini (2019), Bail (2016) constructs weighted networks
between advocacy organizations based on the frequency of words in the shared vocabulary of
their posts. Stewart et al. (2018) construct retweet networks to study the impact of suspicious
troll activity on the levels of polarization on Twitter (see, also, Conover et al., 2011). Farrell
(2016) constructs a network of organizations based on the activities of affiliates to study
polarization on climate change issues among organizations. O’Connor and Weatherall (2018)
propose the network formalism to study polarization in scientific communities around beliefs
based on scientific knowledge. DiFonzo et al. (2013) employ a network-based approach on
capturing polarization of rumor beliefs in the context of social impact theory.
Reconstructing the axiomatic analysis of ER, we characterized a family of measures
within our model. Importing the axiomatic approach needs a careful attention due to the
distinct nature of the geodesic distance on networks compared to the Euclidean distance on
the real line. Our characterization result shows that the class of measures characterized by
ER carries almost intact to the networks. The only bite is in the value of the parameter for
the effect of identification on effective antagonism. We find that α = 1 is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the measures of polarization in the form of aggregate antagonisms
to satisfy the aforementioned axioms, together with hometheticity. We demonstrate that
polarization is maximized when the population is allocated on the two most distant nodes in
the network. Finally, we discuss how restricting to specific class of network structures may
expand the class of polarization measures.
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Our model can be further developed along different dimensions. One promising avenue for
future research pertains to extending the measures so as to capture the intra-group hetero-
geneity, which could also be described as a network. In that case, the identification function
should additionally depend on the within-group structure. Another direction for future
research concerns the existence of interesting characterizations outside the identification-
alienation framework but with the same axioms, as these two are independent.
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A Appendix: Proofs
In what follows, we denote the maximal value of parameter α in ER with α∗ (so that
α∗ ' 1.6).
Lemma 1
Let 1 < α ≤ α∗ and c ∈ (1, 2]. There exists α¯ = α¯(c) ∈ (1, α∗] such that maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) ≤ 0
whenever α ≤ α¯. Furthermore, α¯ is increasing in c.
Proof of Lemma 1. For α ≥ 1, f is concave in z. Thus, the maximum of f is given by the
first order condition:
1
2
(1 + α)
(
2− αzα−1 + (2− (2 + α)c)zα) = 0. (12)
Taking derivative of the value function v(α, c) = maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) with respect to c, and
applying the envelope theorem, we get:
∂v
∂c
=
∂f
∂z
∂z
∂c
+
∂f
∂c
=
∂f
∂c
= −1
2
(α + 2)zα+1 < 0,
so the value function is (strictly) decreasing in c. This means that v(α, c) > v(α, 2), for any
c ∈ [1, 2).
We know from the observations on the function f in (7) discussed in the proof of Theorem
1 that, for any c > 1, v(1, c) < 0. Since f(z, 2, 2) > 0, as pointed out in ER (p. 833) and
v(α, c) is decreasing in c, it must be that v(2, c) > 0 for any c ∈ (1, 2]. Therefore v(1, c) < 0
and v(2, c) > 0 for any c ∈ (1, 2]. To show that there exist α¯(c) from the claim of the Lemma,
we show that v(α, c) is increasing in α. Indeed:
∂v
∂α
=
∂f
∂z
∂z
∂α
+
∂f
∂α
=
∂f
∂α
=
1
2
(2z − zα(1 + cz + (1 + α + (−2 + (2 + α)c)z) ln z)).
To see that the above derivative is positive, first note that the first order condition (12)
implies that at the maximum of f :
zα−1 =
2
α− z(2− (2 + α)c) . (13)
Equation (13) together with the fact that α− 1 > 0 and c > 1 implies that z < 1. Indeed, if
z > 1 then the RHS of (13) would be greater than 1, while the LHS of (13) would be smaller
than 1, since the denominator α− z(2− (2 +α)c) would be greater than 2 since (2 +α)c > 3
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and z > 1. Plugging (13) into the expression for ∂v
∂α
from above. we get:
∂v
∂α
=
1
2
(2z − zα(1 + cz + (1 + α + (−2 + (2 + α)c)z) ln z))
=
1
2
(2z − 2
α− z(2− (2 + α)c)(1 + cz + (1 + α + (−2 + (2 + α)c)z) ln z))
= −z (1− α) + (2− 3c− 2αc)z + [1 + 2α + (−2 + 2c+ αc)z] log z
α− z(2− (2 + α)c) ,
which is clearly positive for z < 1, α ≥ 1 and c > 1.
Therefore, the intermediate value theorem implies that, for any c ∈ [1, 2] there exist
α¯(c) ∈ [1, 2] such that maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) ≤ 0 whenever α ≤ α¯(c) (with equality only when
α = α¯). Finally, ∂v
∂c
< 0 and ∂v
∂α
> 0 imply that α¯(c) increases with c for c ∈ (1, 2].
Lemma 2
Let 0 ≤ α < 1 and c ∈ (1, 2]. There exists α = α(c) ∈ [0, 1] such that maxz≥0 f(α, z, c) ≥ 0
whenever α ≤ α(c). Furthermore, α is decreasing in c.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let α < 1. We first prove that f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 only if z ≥ 1. Then we
show that for z ≥ 1 f is decreasing in α. Therefore v(α, c) = maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) is decreasing
in α.
To show that f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 ⇒ z ≥ 1 we first note that f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 ⇒ f(z, α, 1) ≥ 0
since f is decreasing in c. Hence, to show f(z, α, c) ≥ 0⇒ z ≥ 1 it is sufficient to show that
f(z, α, 1) ≥ 0⇒ z ≥ 1. To prove this implication, we show that z < 1⇒ f(z, α, 1) < 0. We
have
f(z, α, 1) =
1
2
(−1 + 2(1 + α)z − (1 + α)zα − αz1+α)
<− 1 + (1 + α)(2z − z)− αz1+α
<− 1 + (1 + α)z − αz2 = (1− αz)(z − 1) < 0,
where the inequalities follow the fact that α, z < 1.
Next we prove that if z ≥ 1, then f is decreasing in α. We have that:
∂f
∂α
=
1
2
[
2z − zα − czα+1 − zα (1 + α + 2(c− 1)z + αcz) ln z]
We need to show that 2z − zα − czα+1 − zα (1 + α + 2(c− 1)z + αcz) ln z ≤ 0. Dividing
by z, we obtain the inequality
2z1−α ≤ 1 + cz + (1 + α + 2(c− 1)z + αcz) ln z,
which holds as the LHS is not greater than 2, because z ≥ 1 and α− 1 < 0 and the RHS is
not smaller than 2, because c ≥ 1 and z ≥ 1.
Therefore, whenever f(z, α, c) ≥ 0, f is decreasing in α. This implies that v(α, c) =
29
maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) is decreasing in α whenever v(α, c) ≥ 0. We choose α(c) to be equal to a
zero of function v(α, c), whenever this zero exists on [0, 1), and equal to 0 otherwise. Since
v is decreasing in c, and decreasing in α whenever v(α, c) ≥ 0 we have that α(c) decreases
when c increases.
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